A public issue could make a GitHub agent post a private repo in the open
Noma Labs showed that opening an issue in a public repository could make an organization’s GitHub Agentic Workflow read a private repository and publish its contents as a public comment. No account, and no click from anyone on the inside, was needed.
By the NoFly team
on: issues: [assigned] · github-token: ${{ secrets.ORG_READ_PAT }} · safe-outputs: add-comment- Agent
- .github/workflows/triage.md
- Came from
- An issue opened by someone outside the organization
- Rule
- Outsider-written item, a cross-repository read and a reply the outsider can read
- Why
- Assignment fires on an issue anyone can open, the token reads private repositories, and the reply lands on that issue.
What happened
Noma Labs disclosed the technique, which it called GitLost, in July 2026. GitHub Agentic Workflows let a repository define an AI agent, running on Claude or GitHub Copilot, that reacts to issues and pull requests and acts on them with no person signing off.
The proof of concept used a workflow that fired on issue assignment and held read access to the organization’s private repositories. An attacker opened an ordinary issue in a public repository whose body carried instructions. The agent read the issue as its task, fetched the README of both a public and a private repository, and posted them as a public comment anyone could read.
Coverage described the problem as architectural rather than a single bug a patch would close. The pieces that line up, an item anyone can open, a person or bot who acts on it, a credential that reaches other repositories, and a reply posted back where the opener can read it, are each ordinary on their own.
- 01
An outsider opens an issue in a public repository.
- 02
The issue is assigned, and the workflow reads its body as instructions.
- 03
The agent reads a private repository with the token the workflow holds.
- 04
It posts what it read as a comment on the public issue.
Why it worked
Probable cause
The workflow was fired by a trusted action on an item an outsider wrote, held a credential that reached other repositories, and could reply where the outsider could read it.
How NoFly stops it
Discover
A GitHub Agentic Workflow file is read as what it is. When a trigger that lets outsider-written content in, whether through widened roles or an insider action such as assignment or a label on someone else’s issue, lines up with a credential that reaches other repositories and an output the outsider can read, it is raised as a critical leak shape, and the finding names each part. Imports the file merges in at compile time are named too, since what they add is unread rather than safe.
Govern
A repository’s own policy can require review for any change to a workflow, its roles or its tokens, and it can only tighten the rules, never loosen them.
What to do this week
- Keep roles at their default on any workflow trigger an outsider can author.
- Give an agentic workflow the repo-scoped job token, not a stored token or app that reaches other repositories.
- Point safe-outputs and network at this repository only, and treat an issue or PR body as hostile input.
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